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ARTICLE
The Reversal Arbitration Board:







In this article, we describe the development and implementation of an
innovative Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) program that uses neutral
adjudicators to minimize lawsuits between Toyota Motor Sales, USA and its
automobile dealerships. The Toyota Reversal Arbitration Board [hereinafterRAB]
has several distinguishing characteristics. First, while many forms of ADR seek
to shift the focus of disputes away from formal rules, the Toyota RAB was
specifically designed to convey and enforce organizational rules. Second, an
aspect of organizational decision making is entrusted to neutral, outside
adjudicators trained as specialists in the rules and the context out of which disputes
arise. Third, the program involves an asymmetrically binding process: Toyota is
bound by the decision of the neutral, while dealer disputants still have recourse to
the legal system if they are unhappy with the process or outcome.
We argue that the RAB program produces a more focused and accessible
body of decisions than could be obtained from either formal legal adjudication or
the "in-house" system of decision making that it replaced. We also argue that the
process promotes procedural justice and makes the program attractive to dealer
participants. We explore the hypothesis that the program has reduced the
frequency of dealer sales credit disputes by the development of a body of
organizational "common law" that communicates the rights and responsibilities of
involved parties. Finally, we consider how the lessons learned from the program
can be applied in other contexts.
* The authors would like to thank David Laufer, Toyota's Managing Counsel and Professor
Richard Maxwell for their assistance and cooperation in the research and preparation of this article.
** J.D., Executive Director, Private Adjudication Center, Inc.
** JD., Staff Attorney, Manager of Case Administration, Private Adjudication Center Inc.
* Ph.D., Professor of Social Science and Law, Duke University School of Law. Vice
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***** JD., Research Assistant Private Adjudication Center, Inc.
1
Ellis et al.: Ellis: Reversal Arbitration Board:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
1I. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE REVERSAL ARBITRATION BOARD
A. Toyota Policy
Through its retail sales reporting policy, Toyota allots sales credit and certain
sales incentives to its dealers. Dealers receive credit for vehicles sold to ultimate
retail consumers, but not for vehicles sold to wholesalers or other dealers. An
ultimate retail consumer purchases vehicles for use and not for resale. Toyota's
sales reporting policy provides information for its vehicle distribution system
which has the goal of assuring that future production flows to those dealers who
sell to ultimate consumers. The success of the reporting policy depends on
adherence by dealers to strict inventory and sales reporting practices.
Prior to its adoption of the "ultimate consumer" test in the 1970s, Toyota had
operated under an "initial seller" test, whereby the first-selling dealer received
sales credit. Although the initial seller test allowed for perfunctory resolution of
sales credit disputes, it resulted in inefficient allocation of new vehicles and was
subject to abuse by dealers who would report as "sales" the transfer of vehicles to
dealer-owned companies or to brokers who in turn sold to other dealers.
Toyota believes that the "ultimate consumer" test underlying its current sales
reporting policy provides the most equitable method of allocating vehicles among
its dealers. Yet, implementation of the "ultimate consumer' test also presents
problems and abuses in sales reporting. Frequently, two dealers claim sales credit
for the sale of the same vehicles and a dispute arises. Toyota's position is that it
cannot act as a "policeman" in awarding the sales credit. It contends that the first-
selling dealer is in the best position to determine whether customers are genuine
retail buyers or simply wholesale outlets.'
B. Dealer Disputes
Even though Toyota believed2 that the "ultimate consumer" test of its sales
reporting policy had been straightforward over the years, many disputes arose
between dealers over the issue of retail sales credit. These disputes fell into two
typical scenarios. Most commonly, an independent broker3 would purchase
vehicles from a dealer (Dealer 1), pretending to purchase for use, and then, in a
separate and subsequent transaction, sell the same vehicles to another dealer
(Dealer 2). Dealer 1 would request and receive sales credit after the initial sale
to the broker, while Dealer 2 would request sales credit on the same vehicles after
1. While dealers may sell to whomever they choose, any sales to persons who buy from one
dealer in order to sell to another are considered wholesale and will not generate sales credit.
2. Toyota Motor Sales continues to maintain that the "ultimate consumer" test is straightforward.
3. Typically, a broker would pose as an automobile leasing or rental company.
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it had sold them to ultimate consumers.4 In other cases, purchases by brokers
from Dealer 1 were initiated by Dealer 2. 5
Prior to the implementation of the RAB in 1985, Toyota regional offices6
would informally decide sales credit disputes arising in the above situations. The
office would gather information from each dealer involved in the transaction, and
then use a common sense notion of fairness in applying the "ultimate consumer"
test. For example, under the first scenario, sales credit would typicallybe awarded
to Dealer 2, since it had sold the vehicles to the ultimate consumer, any sales
credit initially awarded to Dealer 1 by its prior filing for credit would be reversed.
The regional office would be less likely to award sales credit under the second fact
pattern, if it believed that Dealer 2 induced Dealer 1 into making a nonretail sale.
If either dealer strongly disagreed with the regional office's sales credit
award, the sales department of Toyota's headquarters would resolve the dispute.
Neither the regional offices nor the sales department issued written decisions. As
a consequence, no formalized criteria emerged for establishing what constituted a
sale to an ultimate consumer.
Due to dealer dissatisfaction with in-house decisions, the high cost to Toyota
of policing reported sales, and recurring abuses in sales reporting, Toyota
supplemented the "ultimate consumer" test with other policies designed to reduce
the number of dealer disputes. Sales to dealerships, for instance, qualified as sales
to "ultimate consumers," earning Dealer 1 retail sales credit only if the purchased
vehicles were used to conduct dealership business or to generate revenue for
Dealer 2. Additionally, the sale of vehicles to leasing or rental companies
constituted sales to an ultimate consumer only if the vehicles were both: (1)
placed in legitimate lease or rental service at the time of the sale; and (2) remained
in service for at least 120 days.7 Finally, in 1984, Toyota implemented a policy
whereby sales credit was subject to reassignment (reversal) only if it was reported
by Dealer 2 as resold within sixty days of the original transaction between the
dealers.'
4. Sometimes, the sales credit disputes involved only one vehicle. Other cases involved multi-
vehicle sales, in which a dealer could potentially earn significant sums of money, both through the sale
itself and incentive awards. For example, one case involved the reversal of sales credit for 20 vehicles
and approximately $30,000 in incentive money.
5. In many cases, it was argued that the sale to the broker was initiated by Dealer 2, but this
allegation -was not always proven. See infra note 26 and accmpanying text.
6. In the United States, there are nine Toyota Regions and three Private Distributorships whose
primary function is to distribute Toyota vehicles.
7. Prior to 1986, Toyota required the vehicles to remain in service for at least 180 days.
8. Prior to 1984, Toyota allowed dealers to request reversals within 180 days of the last reported
retail sales date. Implementation of the 60 day rule helped protect dealers who were unwittingly
selling vehicles to brokers.
1994]
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C. Lawsuits Against Toyota
As explained above, sales by Dealer 1 to Dealer 2 or to a broker would not
earn Dealer 1 retail sales credit. However, when Dealer 2 purchased vehicles from
a broker and resold them to retail customers, it would receive credit for the sale,
and Dealer 1, who sold to the broker, would lose the credit it had previously
received. Dealer 1 would frequently object to the loss of its credit, stating that it
sold cars to the broker in good faith and without knowledge that its customer was
a broker. Dealers requesting reversal also voiced complaints about the unfairness
of the decisions of the regional offices and the Toyota Sales Department.
These dealer disputes often resulted in "messy and expensive lawsuits," with
the protesting dealer suing both the reversal requesting dealer and Toyota Motor
Sales.9 In many of these lawsuits, the subject of sales credit would be secondary
to the larger and more complex issues of antitrust laws and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' "[D]iscovery of just the
allegation challenging the sales credit policy in the prior lawsuits cost Toyota
several hundred thousand dollars in legal fees and related expenses."" In one
lawsuit that dealt specifically with the sales credit policy, Toyota settled out of
court for several hundred thousand dollars. 12
HI. DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVERSAL ARBITRATION
BOARD PROGRAM
A. Origin of the RAB
By the Spring of 1985, Toyota was "faced with escalating legal expenses and
dealer hostility over an issue in which Toyota obtained no financial benefit,
regardless of which dealer received sales credit."' 3 -In response to this problem,
Toyota's Legal Department 4 began to design a nonbinding alternative dispute
resolution procedure. Toyota consulted and subsequently hired the Private
Adjudication Center, Inc.'" as the exclusive administrator of the program. Nine
9. Toyota Designs New ADR System for Dealers, ALTERNATrVES TO ThE HaI COST OF LTIG.
(Ctr. for Pub. Resources, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 1985, at 14, 14.
10. Id.
11. Id at15.
12. Telephone inttrvitw with David Laufer, Toyota's Managing Counsel (Dec. 23, 1992).
13. Ctr. for Pub. Resources, supra note 9, at 14.
14. William Plourde, Toyota Vice President and General Counsel for Business Law, and David
Laufer, Toyota's Senior Managing Counsel, were the key players in designing a nonbinding ADR
procedure.
15. The Private Adjudication Center, Inc. is a nonprofit affiliate of Duke University School of
Law that provides research, education, and services in the field of alternative dispute resolution.
[Vol. 1994, No. I
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neutral adjudicators, who were geographically distributed throughout the country,
were selected and met with Toyota to discuss the program.' 6
The group discussed Toyota's sales credit policy and its vehicle allocation
system, and then discussed possible structures for the program. After considering
other ADR processes, the group decided that an arbitration model would most
effectively meet the needs of both the dealers and Toyota. Toyota's original
design of the program had contemplated arbitrators awarding sales credit according
to state laws governing vehicle registration. During the meeting, however, some
of the participants argued that other factors beyond registration laws, such as
dealers' intentions in specific sales, should be considered. The final design of the
program required that arbitrators consider the good or bad faith of the dealers in
a transaction and determine which dealer sold the vehicle to an ultimate consumer.
Toyota agreedto comply with all decisions of the RAB, even though the decisions
would not bind participating dealers.
B. RAB Guidelines
Toyota adopted three exceptions to the "ultimate consumer" rule of its retail
sales credit policy which incorporated considerations of good faith, prudence, and
reasonableness. These exceptions are:
1.) A dealer protesting a sales reversal will receive sales credit if (a)
it can prove by very strong and convincing evidence that it acted
prudently and in good faith, and did all it could reasonably be expected
to do under the circumstances to establish that the purchaser was, in
fact, the ultimate retail customer, AND (b) the requesting dealer did not
act in good faith in obtaining the vehicle from the protesting dealer.
2.) If a protesting dealer can prove by very strong and convincing
evidence that it acted prudently and in good faith, and did all it could
reasonably be expected to do under the circumstances to establish that
the purchaser was, in fact, the ultimate retail customer AND if the
requesting dealer acted in good faith, the reversal request will be
granted; but for allocation purposes only, each dealer will receive one-
half of the sales credit.
3.) Neither the requesting dealer nor the protesting dealer will receive
sales credit if neither acted in good faith. The vehicles will be reversed
into Toyota inventory.
These exceptions permitted the arbitrators to take into account the dealers'
intentions in resolving sales credit disputes. With the adoption of these exceptions,
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arbitrators could resolve sales credit disputes in one of four ways: (1) grant sales
credit to the protesting dealer (i.e., Dealer 1); (2) grant sales credit to the
requesting dealer (i.e., Dealer 2); (3) split the sales credit evenly between the
dealers for allocation purposes only; and (4) refuse to grant credit to either dealer.
C. Rules and Procedures
Dealers, private distributors, Toyota regional offices, and Toyota Motor Sales,
USA may initiate reversal requests. 7 Dealers who request a reversal must do so
within sixty days of the last recorded retail sales date."8 The procedure requires
that the requesting dealer (Dealer 2) file a "Retail Sales Reversal Request Form,"
along with supporting documentation, with its private distributor or the distribution
manager of its region. The distribution manager first reviews reversal requests for
legitimacy and completeness, then notifies Dealer 1 that if it wishes to contest the
credit reversal, it must submit a letter of protest, with supporting documentation
(including a brief written summary of its position), within fourteen days of this
notification. If Toyota receives no protest, it will reverse the sales credit
automatically on the fifteenth day.
A dealer may request a hearing before the RAB if it wishes to protest a
reversal request. After the protesting dealer provides all required information, the
dealer's regional office has seven calendar days within which to negotiate a
resolution with the requesting dealer. If the matter cannot be resolved by
agreement, the regional office must forward the material to the head office of
Toyota by the eighth calendar day. Upon receipt and review of the material,
Toyota forwards the protest documentation to the Private Adjudication Center,
Inc. 9 The Center assigns a case number and an arbitrator to the case, and then
arranges a hearing that is mutually convenient to both dealers.
20
The RAB is informal and inexpensive. Dealers may participate in a RAB
hearing in person, by conference call, or by submission of documents. Most
17. The vast majority of sales credit disputes are initiated by dealers.
18. The last "retail sales date" is most likely the date Dealer 1 sold vehicles to the broker or to
Dealer 2, or the date Dealer 2 sold the vehicles to ultimate consumers.
19. Toyota conducts a review to determine if the protest is frivolous. Regardless of Toyota's
determination, if a dealer insists on bringing a dispute to the RAB, it is forwarded to the Private
Adjudication Center.
The rules also provide that the arbitrator may order the protesting dealer to pay costs of up to
$1000.00 if the protest is determined to be frivolous. In only one hearing has an arbitrator awarded
costs.
20. If the protesting dealer wishes to appear in person before the arbitrator, the Center arranges
for the hearing to take place in that dealer's region, as provided in the rules. The Center arranges for
hearings to occur within two weeks of receipt of documentation. Hearings typically last one-half hour
or less.
[Vol. 1994, No. I
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dealers have participated by conference call, thus eliminating travel expenses."
Attorneys may not assist disputants in the hearings.22 Each side must present its
case within one-half hour, and both the arbitrator and the parties may ask
questions. Arbitrators issue written opinions approximately one week following
the hearing. The Center reviews each decision for accuracy and then forwards it
to the parties and Toyota. 3
IV. THE REVERSAL ARBITRATION BOARD IN OPERATION:
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Cases Arbitrated
With the development of the RAB and the adoption by Toyota of good faith
exceptions to its sales credit policy, dealers gained a forum that accounted for
more facts relevant to the disputed transactions than the prior in-house procedure.
Moreover, the dealers gained quick access to the decisions of the arbitrators
through oral and written communications from the regional offices. The following
discussion explores the hypothesis that RAB arbitrators have issued a consistent
body of opinions that has clarified the sales credit policy and educated dealers as
to their rights and duties under the policy.
In an effort to track the consistency of arbitrators' decisions, we reviewed
271 opinions rendered under the RAB between 1985 and 1991.24 The opinions
were sorted according to the four possible hearing outcomes. 25 An analysis of
what facts led arbitrators to find the good faith or bad faith of disputants was
conducted. The review indicates that arbitrators employed a fairly uniform notion
of "good faith" and that an intelligible body of private common law arose from
the decisions.
21. Of 320 hearings reviewed for the purpose of determining in what manner dealers participated
in the hearings, there were 170 conference calls, seven hearings in which both parties appeared live,
41 hearings in which one party participated by telephone and one relied on documents, 91 hearings in
which one person participated by telephone and one appeared in person, six hearings in which one
person relied on documents and one person appeared live, and five hearings in which both parties
relied on documents only.
22. The assistance of attorneys was considered during the discussion of the design of the RAB.
Lawyers were excluded in order to reduce legal fees.
23. A review is conducted by the Center to confirm correct vehicle numbers and other
typographical errors. It is not a substantive review.
24. Although 293 decisions were randomly selected for review, in 22 cases the arbitrator failed
to make explicit the basis of the decision. The total number of decisions rendered during this period
was 402.
25. Possible outcomes are: (1) reversal granted to Dealer 2; (2) reversal denied to Dealer 2; (3)
reversal granted, but sales credit evenly divided between dealers for allocation purposes; and (4) sales
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1. Classification of Decisions
Recall from the earlier discussion that at the time a sales credit dispute is
brought before an arbitrator, the protesting dealer (Dealer 1) is in possession of
sales credit and the requesting dealer (Dealer 2) seeks the reversal of sales credit
into its account. The sales credit policy states that the dealer who sells to an
ultimate retail consumer gets the credit. There is a presumption in the hearing that
credit will be reversed from the protesting dealer and granted to the reversal-
requesting dealer who actually sold to an ultimate consumer. If the protesting
dealer can convincingly prove all factors under the first exception to the sales
credit policy, it will have overcome this presumption and retain the sales credit.
Consistent with the Toyota sales credit policy, which states that the dealer
who sells to an ultimate retail consumer will receive sales credit, arbitrators
granted a reversal of sales credit in 148 cases, in which it was determined that the
requesting dealer acted in good faith and the protesting dealer failed to carry its
burden on the issues of its good faith, prudence, and reasonability under the
circumstances of the transaction. Of these 148 decisions, arbitrators found that the
protesting dealer failed to ensure that the buyer was an ultimate consumer in 134
cases, knew that it was not selling to an ultimate consumer in five cases, failed to
act in good faith in three cases, and failed to present sufficient evidence of its
good faith in six cases.
Arbitrators awarded sales credit to the protesting dealer in only six of the 271
cases. In each of the six cases, the protesting dealer met its burden of proof under
the first exception to the sales credit policy by establishing its good faith,
prudence, and reasonableness in the investigation of the buyer. In five of the
cases, the requesting dealer was found to be in bad faith, while in the sixth case,
there was insufficient evidence of the reversal-requesting dealer's good faith.26
Following the second exception to the sales credit policy, arbitrators granted
reversal, but divided sales credit between protesting and requesting dealers, in 107
of the 271 cases reviewed.27
Following the third exception to the sales credit policy, arbitrators denied
sales credit to the disputants in ten cases. In eight of the ten cases, the arbitrators
26. After proving its good faith, prudence, and reasonability, the protesting dealer may put the
good faith of the requesting dealer into question. Under appropriate circumstances, the arbitrator may
shift the burden of proof to the requesting dealer to prove its good faith.
27. Although the outcomes were the same, to support their opinions, arbitrators emphasized
different aspects of the second exception to the sales credit policy in these 107 decisions. In 62 of
these cases, arbitrators stated that the protesting dealer acted in good faith; in 41 of the cases,
arbitrators emphasized that the protesting dealer had done all that was reasonably to be expected in
determining if it was selling to an ultimate consumer, in four cases, arbitrators simply found no
evidence of bad faith on the part of the protesting dealers. Arbitrators found that the requesting dealers
had either acted in good faith, or had not been proven to have acted in bad faith, in each of the 107
cases.
[Vol. 1994, No. I
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stressed the inadequate investigation by the protesting dealer of its purchaser,
apparently inferring bad faith from that dealer's unreasonable behavior.2"
Thus, in the majority of cases reviewed (148/271), arbitrators granted reversal
and denied the protesting dealer (Dealer 1) sales credit. In the great bulk of these
cases (134/148), and of cases denying sales credit (8/10), the protesting dealer
(Dealer 1) lost its credit because it had failed to conduct a thorough investigation
of its purchaser.
2. Findings of Good or Bad Faith
Arbitrators' decisions concerning the grant or denial of reversal requests, or
the splitting or denial of sales credit, depended chiefly on findings of the good or
bad faith of each disputant. Our review of thirty randomly selected cases,29
decided by different arbitrators, reveals the fact patterns that gave rise to findings
of bad faith, imprudence, or unreasonable investigation of protesting dealers.30
Although the review discloses some minor inconsistencies in the level of
investigation of buyers required by protesting dealers, on the balance these were
only insignificant differences distinguishing the decisions of the arbitrators.
Prior to the implementation of the RAB program, Toyota identified certain
factors and circumstances relevant to the finding of good or bad faith of
protesting dealers; this information was conveyed to all arbitrators. Those factors
included the following: (1) out of state location of the buyer, (2) number of
vehicles sold; and (3) use of written assurances that vehicles would not be resold
by the buyer to another Toyota dealer. Toyota suggested to the arbitrators that the
first two factors would alert a selling dealer to the possibility of a broker-
purchaser and that a higher level of inquiry into the buyer's identity and business
should be required in such cases. Toyota also explained that the third
circumstance, the existence of written assurances, could cut both ways in the
arbitrators' decisions. On the one hand, Dealer 1 had made some effort to thwart
a broker resale, but on the other hand, Dealer 1 had revealed its suspicions of a
broker transaction.
In the thirty cases we reviewed in detail, arbitrators frequently cited the
factors suggested by Toyota. In approximately one-third of the cases reviewed,
28. In three of the ten cases in which neither dealer received sales credit due to the bad faith of
both disputants, the arbitrator granted the reversal request In the remaining seven cases, reversal was
denied.
29. Decisions from all nine arbitrators were represented.
30. As exemplified in scenario #2, see supra RAB Guidelines Section, Section IlL B., findings
of bad faith on the part of requesting dealers normally depended on evidence of collusion between the
purchasing broker and the requesting dealer, or on intentionally misleading statements made to the
protesting dealer by the requesting dealer who purchased without use of a broker. Facts which
supported collusion were not discussed at length in any of the opinions reviewed. Arbitrators also
failed to discuss at length facts amounting to intentionally misleading conduct. For these reasons, the
review of 30 selected cases focuses on the good or bad faith of protesting dealers and omits analysis
of the good or bad faith of requesting dealers.
19941
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arbitrators considered evidence on the issue of written assurances, and in some of
these decisions, the existence of assurances was discounted by the arbitrators as
self-serving. In all cases reviewed, the arbitrators considered the buyer's location
and the number of vehicles purchased.
Other factors weighed by arbitrators included: whether the buyer paid in
cash; whether the buyer requested the manufacturer's statement of origin for the
vehicles; whether Dealer 1 had prior dealings with the buyer, whether the purchase
was consummated by telephone or in person, whether Dealer 1 had sales credit
reversed in prior transactions; and whether Dealer 1 made a profit on the sale.
Some of these factors were handled uniformly by the arbitrators, such as the
treatment of requests for the manufacturer's statement of origin (MSO). A buyer's
request for MSO's indicated a sophisticated buyer, and might alert Dealer 1 to a
suspect transaction. Other factors such as "prior dealings" and "prior reversals"
were handled differently by arbitrators. One arbitrator held that uncontested prior
transactions with a leasing company indicated that the buyer was a legitimate
ultimate consumer, while another arbitrator required an investigation by Dealer 1
into the existence of lessees before the current sale could be held reasonable and
prudent even though the transaction involved the same customer. Arbitrators
viewed the existence of "prior reversals" against a particular dealer in varying
ways. One arbitrator, in denying a protesting dealer credit, did not let the absence
of prior reversals compensate for a wholly inadequate investigation of the buyer
by the protesting dealer. Another arbitrator, in granting half credit to the
protesting dealer in another case characterized by an inadequate investigation of
the buyer, mentioned the absence of prior reversals, although the arbitrator did not
indicate that this was the basis for the decision.31
All arbitrators weighed heavily the circumstance of "buyer status" in their
decisions. Sales to leasing or rental companies, or to dealerships, required some
substantial investigation32 by the selling dealer in order to prove its good faith
and reasonability. Given no other unusually suspect circumstances, a lesser
investigation33 was required for the sale of a single car to an individual if Dealer
1 knew the individual to be in the business of leasing or selling cars. In the cases
reviewed, all arbitrators agreed that the sale of one car to a person in her status
31. The existence of "prior reversals" is a less significant factor in the reasoning of the
arbitrators. The apparent inconsistency noted in the text may be explained by differences in "buyer
status" and "number of vehicles sold." In the first case, the buyer was a leasing company negotiating
for the purchase of eighteen vehicles, while in the second case, the buyer was an individual buying a
single automobile.
32. One arbitrator found that the following steps taken by a protesting dealer that had been
approached by a leasing company constituted a good faith effort: (1) inquiries submitted to its regional
office or private distributorship about the alleged leasing company; (2) contacting other regions to
check for any record of reversals involving the leasing company; (3) calling dealers from which the
leasing company had previously purchased vehicles; and (4) contacting the bank of the leasing
company to determine the legitimacy of the prospective buyer.
33. Under these facts, an arbitrator found that merely checking the list of "suspect" leasing
companies maintained by the regions and private distributorships, and verifying the business address
of the buyer, met the good faith requirement for the protesting dealer.
[Vol. 1994, No. I
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as an individual"' was reasonable without investigation, even if the individual
lived out of state and purchased the vehicle by telephone. Apparently, arbitrators
felt that such sales were in the normal course of business and that the Toyota sales
credit policy required no special efforts under such circumstances.
This review of thirty selected cases suggests that, on the whole, differences
among arbitrators' opinions are insignificant regarding the good faith of protesting
dealers and that an intelligible body of private common law has arisen from the
decisions. Dealers and regional managers may read the decisions of the RAB and
quickly isolate the factors in a transaction that arbitrators have considered relevant
to the good or bad faith of the protesting dealers, such as buyer status and number
of vehicles sold.
3. Comparison of Arbitrator Decisions
to Prior Decision Making
This development of a private "common law"3 of sales credit disputes
through the decisions of the RAB appears to illustrate the significant advantages
of the Toyota program over both the prior in-house decisions of Toyota and the
past court opinions in dealer/Toyota lawsuits. The decisions of the RAB have
resulted in a consistent interpretation of the good faith exceptions to Toyota's sales
credit policy, providing dealers with guidance on how to conduct themselves in
suspect transactions. By way of contrast, prior decisions by the courts, often
arising under RICO or antitrust issues, had focused more on the duties of Toyota
to its dealers than on the relative rights of dealers to disputed sales credit. Beyond
the marginal relevance of these court decisions to dealers disputing sales credit,
the decisions were surely more difficult and expensive to access than the decisions
of the RAB. Dealers might need to hire attorneys, for example, to locate and
explain the impact of the most recent Toyota/dealer dispute. In any event, dealers
apparently did not view Toyota as a neutral party that issued fair and
comprehensive rulings that provided precedential value."6
The accessible, evenly reasoned opinions of the RAB have proven more
helpful to dealers than the prior in-house decisions by Toyota. As mentioned
before, the decisions of the arbitrators may have been more consistent and well
reasoned due to the specialized training they received. Before the implementation
of the RAB, Toyota published neither the reasoning, nor the outcome, of its
34. In one case, the protesting dealer testified that he had sold one car to an individual and had
performed his "customary inquiry" to confum that the buyer was not a broker. Nonetheless, the
arbitrator denied credit to the protesting dealer upon evidence that title had passed from the dealer to
the company, rath er than to the indi&vidual.
35. Although no decision of one arbitrator is binding on another, the availability of decisions
among arbitrators, the great similarity of fact patterns, and the repeated experiences of the arbitrators
has led to the development of a body of organizational law that communicates to the participants
appropriate guidelines for compliance with the sales credit policy.
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decisions in dealer disputes. Dealers had no way of knowing what factors Toyota
might consider in implementing its strict ultimate consumer test, whether Toyota
would equally weigh the same factors in all dealer disputes, or whether Toyota,
which had no financial interest in the outcome of any of the dealer disputes it
decided, would thoroughly and vigorously investigate all cases. The RAB
program addressed all of these shortcomings and provided an inexpensive means
by which dealers could acquire the information needed to conform to Toyota's
sales credit policy.
B. Issues of Procedural Fairness
1. Survey of Participants
An early survey of sixty-one dealers who participated in the RAB confirmed
general satisfaction with the program. 37 Sixty-six percent of the dealers had a
favorable reaction to the creation of the RAB. Ninety-five percent felt that the
"Guidelines and Procedures" were understandable. Eighty percent of the dealers
felt that the procedure was fair, while ninety-eight percent perceived the arbitrator
as impartial. Seventy-one percent of the dealers said they were satisfied with the
RAB procedure. To date, all RAB decisions have been accepted by dealers and
none have sought recourse in the traditional court system.
2. Procedural Justice Issues
A growing body of research literature has focused on what has been labeled
"procedural justice."3 This literature shows that the perceived fairness of a
procedural process has important implications not only for whether disputing
parties feel they have obtained justice, but also for their subsequent behaviors and
their willingness to use the procedures again. The research further indicates that
in some instances, procedural fairness appears to be more important than the
outcome itself: e.g., clear losers in a dispute may still feel that justice was done.
While our study of the RAB procedure was not intended to be a test of the aspects
of procedural justice theory, two components of the program deserve comment
because they help explain dealer satisfaction with the RAB.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., E. ALLA LIND T AL., TE PERCEPTON OF JUSTICE: TORT ITIGANTS' VIEWS
OF TRIA, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETrLEMENT CONFERENCES (1989); E.
ALLAN L1JD & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PoCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN
TMIAUT & LMJRINS WALUE, PROCURAL JuMMc: A PSYCHOLOMCAL ANALYMS (1975), S.
Alexander & M Ruderman, The Role of Procedural and Distributive Justice in Organizational
Behavior, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 117 (1987); Ronald L. Cohen, Procedural Justice and Participation, 38
HUM. REL. 643 (1985); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder. Tort Litigants' Evaluations
of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 953 (1990); Neil Vidmar,
ProceduralJustice andAlternaive DisputeResolution, 3 PSYCHOL SCL 224 (1992); Neil Vidmar, The
Origins and Consequences of Procedural Fairness, 15 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 877 (1990).
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An important component of the program is the replacement of Toyota
regional offices and the sales department with independent neutrals. Although
Toyota perceived itself to be neutral and fair toward individual dealers on the
matter of which one obtained the sales credit in disputed cases, it may not have
been viewed as an independent and neutral party. It held great power not only
with respect to the sales credit policy, but also with respect to a host of other
issues bearing on its dealers. Prior to the RAB, Toyota provided the sales credit
and adjudicated disputes arising out of its own sales credit policy. The problem
with dealers' perceptions may have been further exacerbated by Toyota's failure
to provide written explanations for its decisions in individual cases. The RAB is
probably perceived as inherently more fair because the arbitrators are not Toyota
officials. The imprimatur of neutral decision makers may alleviate concerns of
unfairness.39
Even the impartiality of the judges may not be as crucial to an impression of
fairness of the process as the parties' perception of fairness which is affected by:
(1) the opportunity to express oneself, and (2) the opportunity to have views
considered by someone in power.40 The in-house mechanism of dispute
resolution initiated by Toyota managers may have impaired the dealers' ability to
fully and openly present information and make arguments.' Some studies
conducted of managers acting as dispute resolvers indicate that "[m]anagers...
may not provide any structured procedure for the presentation of evidence and
arguments," 42 and "often censor individual disputants ... .43
Toyota arbitrators are knowledgeable about Toyota policy and the factual
circumstances that give rise to disputes. Indeed, through experience and training,
they are far more knowledgeable about the situation and the rules than a judge in
a court of general jurisdiction. Moreover, their decisions are limited to the sales
dispute itself, without other issues that complicated the sales credit disputes in the
pre-RAB lawsuits.
39. James F. Henry, Alternative Dipsute Resolution: Meeting the Legal Needs of the 1980s, 1
OHIO ST. 3. ON DIEP. RssoL 113, 116 (1985).
40. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 38. An early survey of Toyota dealers indicated that out of
fifty-eight dealers, only one felt that they did not have sufficient time to present their case. Forty-four
dealers indicated that the arbitrator understood their position, six felt that the arbitrator did not
understand, and eight were uncertain.
41. See Lon L Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HAIV. L REV. 353, 355
(1978).
42. Deborah M. Kolb, Who are Organizational Third Parties and What Do They Do? In
REsEAPcH ON NEaOTIATIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS 207 (Roy J. Lewicki, Blair H. Sheppard, and Max
H. Bazerman eds., 1986).
43. Blair H. Sheppard, Managers as Inquisitors: Some Lessons From the Law, in 1 MAx H.
BAZE.MAN & ROY J. LEmWCKI, NEOOIATINo IN ORtGANIZATIONS 193, 203 (1983) (for example, little
investigation into circumstances of dispute by managers; snap decisions by managers; and inadequate
consideration of circumstances by managers).
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There is also some literature that indicates that important organizational
attitudes are affected by procedural justice judgments. The literature argues that
these judgments are a strong determinant of participants' reactions to decision
making and may have strong effects on attitudes about organizations and
authorities versus attitudes about specific outcomes. The RAB effectively dealt
with the complaints of the dealers without the perceptionthat Toyota management
influenced the outcome. The literature suggests that employees will investigate
internal procedures carefully if they do not perceive them as fair and this
perception may impact negatively on job performance and compliance with
organizational rules."
The procedural justice literature indicates that disputants are often willing to
place their dispute in the hands of a third party and even accept the validity of
decisions that are unfavorable to them as long as the third party is perceived as
neutral and they have an opportunity to fully present the facts and arguments for
their case.45 The RAB hearing provides this opportunity.
b. The Asymmetric Binding Character of the RAB
We are accustomed to thinking of alternative dispute resolution procedures
as either binding or nonbinding. In contrast, the Toyota RAB procedure is
asymmetrically binding: only Toyota is bound by the arbitrator's decision, a
dealer who is dissatisfied with the arbitrator's decision may pursue the case in
court. This asymmetric binding is a further feature of the RAB that helps to
reduce actual and perceived imbalances of power between Toyota and its dealers.
Through the act of agreeing to be bound by the decisions of its arbitrators, Toyota
has expressed its faith in the fairness of the RAB, and at the same time, provided
dealers with an option, namely, to seek legal recourse, that it does not have.
The survey does not provide actual data bearing on the degree to which
asymmetric binding influences perceptions of procedural justice. Wepresent it as
a hypothesis that has inherentplausibility and is conceptually interesting, but needs
further research attention.
C. Evaluating Corporate Goals for the Program
1. Goals for the Program
The RAB was createdto avoid unnecessary confrontation with dealers, reduce
escalating litigation costs, improve relations between dealers and Toyota
management, and reduce the number of dealer disputes. Interviews with Toyota
executives indicate a belief that all of these goals have been accomplished."
44. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 38.
45. See LND & TYLER, supra note 38; Lind et al, supra note 38; Vidmar, Procedural Justice,
supra note 38; Fuller, supra note 41.
46. Telephone interview with David Laufer, Toyota's Managing Counsel (June 4, 1991).
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Since the creation of the RAB, disputes between Toyota and its dealers over the
sales reporting policy have virtually disappeared and dealer/management
relations have improved. Furthermore, the approximate annual cost of the RAB
to Toyota is $30,000.004' - far less than the cost of defending some individual
lawsuits.
48
2. Decline in Dealer Disputes
As noted, the number of dealer disputes has substantially declined since the
implementation of the RAB. After handling 178 cases in the final eight months
of 1985, the program processed 44 hearings in 1986, 79 hearings in 1987, 40
hearings in 1988, 23 hearings in 1989, 11 hearings in 1990, 3 hearings in 1991,
and 27 hearings in 1992.
The RAB program created a mechanism for the development of a national
list of brokers. Anytime a broker is identified through the RAB, its name is added
to the list available to all dealers through the regional offices and Toyota's head
office. A dealer may check the list for the broker's name before entering into a
suspicious transaction. This broker list has provided many protesting dealers with
a clear warning that they will not receive sales credit for sales to suspect brokers
and may have some impact on the reduction in disputes. No such information on
brokers was available prior to the RAB.
We explored some of the possible explanations for the dramatic decline in the
number of dealer/dealer disputes since the implementation of the program. We
considered whether dealers who had participated in a hearing before the RAB, or
who had learned about hearings involving other dealers, might have come to
understand the Toyota policies better, appreciate their responsibilities, and abide
more closely by the policies clarified through the process of private judging. We
also considered the impact of the neutral forum and emerging private common
law.
In order to test these hypotheses, relevant information was gathered from the
following sources: (1) interviews with Toyota regional and private distributorship
managers; 49 (2) a review of opinions where at least one disputant had participated
in the RAB more than once;5 and (3) interviews with Toyota arbitrators.
Most regional managers thought that dealers had learned more about the sales
credit policy since the advent of the RAB. Three of the eleven managers
interviewed felt that education about the policy occurred more through district
meetings and general mailings than firsthand knowledge of RAB decisions. In
short, they felt that the "common law" arising out of the RAB was conveyed to
47. In 1985, the RAB cost $6,500.00 a month. Ctr. for Pub. Resources, supra note 9, at 15.
Toyota budgeted $80,000.00 forthe RAB in fiscal year 1986, $30,000 in 1991, and $25,000 in 1992.
Telephone interview with David Laufer, Toyota's Managing Counsel (Dec. 23, 1992).
48. David Laufer, Toyota's Managing Counsel, estimated the cost of one lawsuit to be
$200,000.00.
49. One manager who had been hired only recently did not participate in the interviews.
50. The first and last hearings of 83 repeat disputants were reviewed.
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dealers indirectly. One manager said that dealers understood that they could get
a consistent interpretation of the policy through the RAB.
Five of the nine arbitrators that were interviewed agreed with the majority
of managers. When asked whether dealers learned more about the sales credit
policy as a result of participating in the RAB, all five arbitrators answered
affirmatively.
The most striking evidence regarding the dealers' learning experience
surfaced in a selective review of RAB opinions. One would expect some
improvement in outcome, or at least a heightened awareness of the Toyota policy,
from those dealers who had participated in more than one hearing. Few dealers,
however, improved their position in subsequent disputes. Most dealers receiving
half credit in their first dispute received half credit in their final dispute; dealers
denied credit in their first hearing were usually denied sales credit in a subsequent
hearing.51
Given the varied responses as to whether the RAB educated dealers and
thereby contributed to the decline in sales credit disputes, the interviewees were
asked what they believed had caused the decline in the number of sales credit
disputes.
Managing Counsel David Laufer attributed the decline in disputes to the
implementation of the RAB, noting the concurrence of the decline and the creation
of the RAB. The arbitrators' opinions regarding the decline varied. One said that
dealers find the results in the RAB more predictable, another that dealers are now
more cautious, and another that product availability explains the decline in
disputes. Two arbitrators concluded that the decline related to improved
understanding of the sales credit policy by dealers.
The majority of Toyota regional/private distributorship managers (9/11)
attributedthe decline in disputes chiefly to product availability. One attributed the
decline to a better understanding of both the sales credit policy and the operation
of the RAB, while another thought it was due to both product availability and
incentive programs. Seven managers said that the RAB did not affect the number
of disputes, three said that it had some impact, and one manager was unsure of the
program's effect.
An increase in the supply of vehicles relative to consumer demand is an
explanation for the decline in disputes which is supported by the facts.
Apparently, a great demand for Toyota vehicles arose several years preceding the
creation of the RAB. Due to inadequate supply, dealers hired brokers to buy
vehicles from other dealers and then used the RAB proceeding to obtain reversals
of sales credit upon the subsequent sale to ultimate consumers. Although demand
51. In one hearing, the arbitrator accepted a low level of investigation of the buyer, but informed
the protesting dealer that in future cases more extensive investigation would be required to earn sales
credit
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for Toyotas remains strong today, there is currently a sufficient supply of
vehicles.52 Dealers no longer rely on brokers, and thus, fewer disputes over sales
credit arise. Most managers predict that if the demand again begins to exceed the
supply of vehicles, dealers will buy vehicles through brokers and sales credit
disputes will increase.
Given this evidence, one may reasonably hypothesize that product availability
has reduced the number of sales credit disputes since the creation of the RAB.
This fact raises a caution against ascribing total credit for the decline in dealer
disputes to the RAB. However, even if the product availability hypothesis is valid,
the other evidence described above indicates that the RAB did play some role in
reducing disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
The implementation of the RAB appears to have substantially improved
relations between Toyota and its dealers by providing an appropriate forum for the
enforcement of corporate policy. A small panel of experienced, neutral
adjudicators, rather than the managers or other employees of Toyota, decide the
sales credit disputes. Participants perceiveboth the decision makers and the forum
to be more fair than the in-house procedures it replaced. This confidence in the
neutrality of the forum, the expertise of the decision makers, and the overall
fairness of the process may lead to a higher level of satisfaction over the
resolution of sales credit disputes.
A consistent body of private "common law" has emerged with the adoption
of good/bad faith exceptions to the sales credit policy, the training and experience
of a small panel of adjudicators, and the distribution of RAB decisions among
arbitrators and dealers. The RAB "common law" appears to have significantly
aided the corporation in its effort to convey and communicate organizationalrights
and responsibilities. The RAB also substantially reduces both the cost to dealers
of airing their complaints and to Toyota in defending potential lawsuits arising
therefrom.
Features of the Toyota RAB program can serve as a model for other ADR
programs. The most obvious and direct application may be in the development
of programs in other contexts when disputes arise between corporations and their
franchisees.
Another possible application maybe in the design of "in-house" programs for
resolving complaints about race, gender, or disability discrimination. 3 Many
52. Toyota built an assembly plant in the United States which increased vehicle supply. Market
fluctuations might be thought to explain the decline in disputes, but Toyota sales have increased during
the course of the program.
53. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of CivilRights Law, 97 AM. J. OF Soc. 1531 (1992) (discussion of organizational structures
developed to deal with discrimination); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational
Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. OF Soc. 1401
19941
17
Ellis et al.: Ellis: Reversal Arbitration Board:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
organizations that have developed in-house procedures to deal with employee
complaints utilize other members of the organization, e.g., a supervisor or member
of another department, as a third party, "neutral" arbitrator. In-house personnel
may have the advantage of knowing organizational rules and procedures, but in
other respects, they are not neutral parties, and may not be perceived as such.
Their role is inherently divided between deciding what is fair in a dispute and
protecting the overriding goals of the organization. Sometimes fairness and
organizational goals are the same; sometimes they are not. The Toyota RAB
concept of neutral parties, who are independent of the organization, but easily
educated about its culture and rules, eliminates the role conflict. Similarly, the
notions of asymmetric binding may help to demonstrate the organization's belief
in the fairness of the procedure and promote its legitimacy and acceptance by
complainants.
We offer these observations with limited empirical evidence bearing on their
validity, but with the belief that they have prima facie plausibility. At the very
least, they provide some ways of thinking about the design of ADR programs and
invite questions for more research.
To summarize, our investigation of the Toyota RAB program has described
several novel ideas that might be used in the design of other ADR programs.
These are: (1) the use of a procedure to communicate and enforce formal rules
and obligations; (2) the use of neutral arbitrators who are specialists in the sense
that they have been trained about the organizational rules and about the cultural
and organizational context out of which disputes arise; and (3) the use of
asymmetric binding whereby the organization that sets up and promotes the
procedure reduces an actual or perceivedpower imbalance by providing a right of
appeal to complainants but surrenders its own right to do so. Adopted in
appropriate contexts, these features may promote proceduraljustice and discourage
litigation that is costly to both parties.
(1990). See also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1991), which
states that 'the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations,
conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising underthis chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. 1991). The broad scope of the Act will
likely cause organizations to incorporate complaints based on disabilities into existing complaint
structures or to develop new procedures.
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